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1. Introduction 
 
Very few economists, I imagine, would dissent from a claim that technology and its 
correlates occupy a central role in the performance of real economies and that changes in 
technology are central to an understanding of growth and development, to the theory of 
competition and the nature of the firm, and to the explanation of shifts in comparative 
advantage, as well as and many other problems.  As the bridge between the productive factors 
and human satisfaction it is an integral part of any theory of coordination and of the structure 
of economic life.  Ever since the pioneering work of Abramovitz and Solow in the 1950s 
economists have been acutely aware of the fact that increases in the productivity of a 
representative bundle of inputs account for the bulk of aggregate economic growth1.  But this 
idea was broadly accepted by earlier economists among whom Smith, Marx, Marshall and 
Schumpeter would certainly be in the forefront.  The idea that these changes in productive 
                                                 
1 See Abramovitz (1956, 1989, chapter 1), and Solow,(1957).  We might note that if the neoclassical growth 
steady growth story is taken seriously then steady growth implies that all of the growth of output per employee 
is attributable to technical progress because the associated rate of capital deepening is induced by, and could not 
occur independently of the rate of technical progress.  In familiar terminology, the shifts around the production 
function are induced by shifts in the production function.   Outside of the neoclassical framework this point was 
developed in detail in Rymes (1971). For further critical assessment see Nelson (1973) 
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efficiency are closely tied to changes in underlying technology is widely accepted even if 
only by assertion for technology is always a shadow cast by the activities in which we are 
interested.  It is not redundant, therefore to poise the question “what do economists mean by 
technology?” 
 
Unfortunately, there is no straightforward response to this question, and any particular answer 
usually depends on the wider framework of problems in which a concept of technology has to 
fit.  The concept of technology that is central to an evolutionary account of uneven economic 
development, for example, is far removed from the concept that is required in a theory of a 
static or stationary economic equilibrium.  What they all have in common is the idea that 
whatever technology is it is inseparable from the exercise of human agency and must 
therefore have features that are compatible with the limitations of human agency.  By 
technology, we can mean a body of understanding of cause and effect in human minds, as 
with the codified realisations of productive knowledge in operating manuals, blueprints, 
recipes, scientific papers and so on; as the capacities and skills that permit action whether 
individually or in cooperation with others, not all of which will be written down; and, the 
purposefully organised and designed built structures within which action tales place- the 
realised, human built world as Hughes (2004) has called it.   
 
Technology is a complex notion and to develop this theme we shall proceed in three stages, 
beginning with the idea of a production function and the more primitive notion of a 
productive activity, then discussing the differences between a production menu and the 
material and energy basis for production, and, finally, introducing some brief observations on 
the main trajectories of technical change that follow from the energy and materials 
perspective.  Throughout there is a general theme that technology is also a matter of the 
organisation and management of production systems, as well as of direct productive 
knowledge in a mechanical or chemical sense.  Its systems are composed of interrelated 
activities that have an architecture comprising structures of modules and components2.  It is 
this perspective that places our discussion firmly within a division of labour tradition, albeit 
with modern twists.  
 
                                                 
2 As far as I know the fruitful idea of a technology architectures was formulated by Henderson and Clark, (1990) 
The theme has been richly developed by Langlois and Robertson (1995) in their discussion of the boundaries of 
the firm 
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2. Technology and the Production Function 
 
There is little to be said here that has not been said many times before, but some brief 
observations will help to put our discussion into perspective.  In Adam Smith the nature of 
technology is subsumed within the idea of the division of labour between and within different 
lines of production.  The principle idea is of the sequencing of production activities in a 
number of complementary tasks or stages in production. . It is the idea of sequencing that 
connects with the capital saving nature of specialisation (fewer sets of productive instruments 
are needed) and with the Babbage principle that the size of the production team that 
maximises the productivity of labour is that size which satisfies the principle of common 
multiples (Leijonhvud,1986).  Smith’s attitude to technology is closely related to the 
dynamics of his theory of economic development, in which technical change amounts to an 
ever more refined division of labour and is induced by and in turn induces the growth of the 
market.  This is the view that was subsequently taken up in Allyn Young’s famous paper and 
which was discussed extensively by Marshall3.  In particular, the division of labour is a 
dynamic principle stimulating the invention of new machinery and new knowledge in 
general.  While the accumulation of skill in any fine task is likely to be bounded, the prospect 
of inventing sequences of better machines is not.  As Frank Knight once expressed it, the 
fundamental point about the division of labour is that it is also system for increasing the 
efficiency of learning and thus the growth of knowledge (Knight, 1933, p. 18).   
 
Despite its importance to any discussion of how economic means are made operational, 
modern economics, almost universally, has very little to say about the division o f labour.  
Instead, the primitive notion of technology runs in terms of a specification of the quantities of 
various inputs required to produce a given quantum of a particular kind of output over some 
definite time interval, and given the understanding of the state of the art in the minds of those 
operating the process.  This perspective of technology as a menu (for it is less than a 
blueprint) appears most obviously in the theory of production and consequently in the theory 
of the firm, which is taken to be the controlling and managing unit of any production activity.  
All that is needed to specify the technology are the lists of inputs and outputs, all other 
dimensions are of no economic interest.  Technology is simply the unexplained constraint on 
                                                 
3 Young (1928) and Marshall (1920)  Marshall devotes the great part of book 4 to the many ways in which the 
division of labour develops over time within the framing idea that knowledge and organisation are the two most 
powerful of productive forces.  Kaldor (1972) is very much in this tradition. 
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human action in relation to production.  It is not even considered necessary to specify the 
inputs in any detail, nor to account for what it is they do in production.  The menu approach 
has a long tradition.  No less an authority than Lionel Robbins opined that “The technical arts 
of production are simply to be grouped among the given factors influencing the relative 
scarcity of different economic goods” (1932, p. 33)4.  In neoclassical economic theory, more 
generally, the formulation of technology has a long history, going back at least to Wicksteed, 
who, in his ‘The Co-ordination of the Laws of Distribution” (1894), states his central premise 
as follows: “The Product being a function of the factors of production we have P=f(a .b. 
c,……)”.  This abstract way of representing the recipe for a production process has not 
changed in its essentials since then.  Half a century later, Samuelson (1947) makes virtually 
the same statement, namely, “We assume as given by technical considerations the maximum 
amount of output x, which can be produced from any given set of inputs   ….” (p. 
57).  It is repeated without limit or significant variation in countless economic texts (eg., 
Bronfenbrenner, 1971; Ferguson, 1971).  Murray Brown (1966) summed up the general 
position very clearly in terms of four abstract properties of any technology menu, namely, the 
efficiency with which inputs generate outputs, the degrees of economies of scale, the relative 
proportions in which the inputs are employed, and the ease of substituting one input for 
another.   
( nvv ,,1 K )
                                                
 
The production function is a derived notion; it is based on the more fundamental concept of a 
productive activity, a particular way of getting certain things done5.  A menu, however, only 
specify the quantities of all the inputs that are required to produce a given quantum of output 
within a given period of time, not the how of getting things done.  It presupposes a particular 
state of understanding but the specification of the requisite blueprint or recipe, how the inputs 
are combined, the sequences that are possible, the spatial separation of the stages of an 
activity, the rationale for why things are done in a particular way are not part of the activity 
concept.  The set of activity menus in relation to a particular line of production defines the 
productive opportunity and of all the possible menus that are known, a subset defines the 
efficient frontier, depicting those activities that generate the greatest quantum of output from 
 
4 Commenting further on this in relation to the practice of economic history he adds, “The precise shape of the 
early steam engine and the physical principles upon which it rested are of no concern of the economic historian 
as economic historian.  For him it is significant because it affected the supply of and the demand for certain 
products and certain factors of production, because it affected the price and income structures of the 
communities where it was adopted”, p. 41.  
5 Koopmans, (1951)and Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow (1958) 
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a particular quantum of inputs, and, with sufficient continuity in the set of activities, the 
efficient frontier becomes the traditional, smooth production function6.. Furthermore, the 
inputs are distinguished one from another only by their imperfect substitutability, the basis 
for the law of diminishing marginal returns, not for their intrinsic characteristics.  Implicit 
here is the idea that the technical details of production are an economic irrelevance, in that 
two quite different menus, drawing on different states of the art, are from the point of view of 
production economics the same method of production if they have the same transformative 
characteristics.  A further important distinction is between the production function as a 
planning concept and the production function as a realised method of production 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p. 1027).  In the first, ex ante context, what is currently known to the 
managers and their advising engineers and designers is the planning constraint on the 
selection of the most cost effective method available.  It is what Salter (1960) called the best 
practice frontier, defined by the menu sets that are based on the most productive knowledge 
available.  Once a design is chosen and embodied in a particular plant as an operational 
method, the scope ex post, for varying the production method may be severely circumscribed 
by the side constraints implicit in the embodiment of methods in capital structures.  Hence the 
famous distinction made by Marshall between short run variations in the labour and material 
inputs that change the degree of utilisation of an existing plant, and longer run variations 
where the design of the plant may be altered and re-engineered in part or in whole to 
accommodate to changes in best practice knowledge.  Of course, these distinctions are 
matters of degree and constitute a continuum of possible variations in production method 
rather than sharply delineated stages.   
 
If we probe a little deeper into the menu then the question of the nature of the inputs needs to 
be addressed, in particular, the distinction between produced inputs and factor inputs.  By 
factor inputs, the neoclassical economist means the services of the ultimate agents of 
production, land, labour and capital specified to different degrees of exactness.  This in turn 
reflects a perspective on the production process as a linear transformation of the factor 
service inputs into final goods with the production of intermediate forms of goods as inputs 
implicitly netted out.  This is quite different from the classical view of production in which 
                                                 
6 Continuity yields well defined marginal products, and economically relevant region of the efficient frontier is 
only a subset of the technically efficient sub set, namely the region of operation for which, as input proportions 
vary, the marginal products of all the inputs are positive.  The efficient economic domain was distinguished 
forcefully by Frank Knight (1921).  A thorough, modern treatment of the limited region of economic efficiency 
is given in Ferguson (1971). 
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the role of intermediate produced means of production, from circulating materials in process 
to more durable capital instruments, is at the core of the treatment of production.  Instead of 
focusing on the isolated menu for producing a particular good or service, the emphasis shifts 
to the system of production as a whole and the conditions for its reproduction and expansion.  
This gives rise to a circular flow perspective, in which goods are worked on to produce goods 
within an input output structure that captures a sophisticated division of labour in the 
production process (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995; Carter, 1970).  If the system is to continue in a 
self sustaining way, the  material inputs used up in one production cycle, including worn out 
capital goods, must be replaced from the outputs of that production cycle, giving rise to the 
distinction between gross output and net output from which later consumption and investment 
are drawn.  In systems theory terms, this is a matter of the conditions for autopoiesis or self 
sustaining organisation.  We note here that the price system now appears to have an extended 
logic, not only to generate income for the ultimate factors of production but also to generate 
the revenue required to purchase the produced materials and energy to reproduce the pattern 
of production.  A related but different take on the same theme is provided by the Austrian 
stages of production concept in which the emphasis shifts to the sequential time phased 
nature of production goods produced at one date becoming available for further processing at 
later dates, until we reach the stage at which they become final goods (Menger, 1871, Hicks, 
1973).  Because the circular and the time phased views are different ways of dealing with the 
same phenomenon of goods in process, it is not surprising that they can be rendered as 
equivalent ways of representing a system of production in which time and structure are 
complementary concepts7.  What all of these approaches have in common is the notion of a 
technology menu as the given and unexplained basis for productive activity  
 
For many problems in static and stationary analysis, the activity as menu idea is perfectly 
sensible, all explanations take some elements as primitive and beyond the explanatory scope 
of the theory.  The factor proportions theory of comparative advantage is an obvious 
example, where an assumed international identity of a given industry’s technology across 
countries is a key element in the account of how trade patterns are generated.  It is when we 
turn to problems of growth and development, and thus to questions of innovation and 
technological change, that the menu approach to technology becomes problematic, precisely 
                                                 
7 See Burmeister, 1974 for a detailed elaboration of this point.  The Sraffian analysis in terms of production in 
terms of dated quantities of labour falls into the same general category of time phased analysis.  See Kurz and 
Salvadori, (1995), for extended discussion. 
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because growth and development are so closely connected to changes in technology.  The 
central problem to be addressed is that the idea of crisply delineated menu choice sets begins 
to crumble between our fingers when we realize that enterprise, invention, localised, 
differentiating, creative process, and that the very conduct of economic activity gives rise to 
new technological knowledge and so induces corresponding changes in more basic 
understanding of the phenomena at work.  One has to move beyond the idea of technology as 
the menu of inputs and outputs to a more finely detailed understanding of the multiple 
dimensions that characterise different ways of doing things.  This is the basis for the idea that 
a blue print or recipe lies behind a particular menu, specifying what it means to get things 
done.  But just as there is more to the blueprint than a menu so there is more to the actual 
doing than is specified in a recipe.  What has to be added is knowledge of who is using the 
recipe because their personal knowledge and skills make a difference to what the recipe leads 
to.  When a recipe is being articulated by an organisation (a firm, or university or medical 
centre, or public bureaucracy) this makes the specification of the origins of the menus in 
operation a particularly rich source of technological differentiation8.  Instead of a crisp 
boundary between what is possible, what is impossible and what is technically irrelevant we 
have a region of technological possibilities in which a range of different menus and recipes 
co exist for carrying out the same activity  
 
Rather than technological knowing it is technological ignorance that now comes to the fore, 
within an evolutionary, developmental perspective in which production possibilities are 
constrained by a lack of problem solving ability in relation to ends that are considered 
desirable.  It is a scarcity of technological capability that induces the endless search for 
improvements in understanding of the productive arts; and, because scarcity is indeed a 
fundamental economic problem, it is hardly surprising that it continuously invites attempts to 
invent it away.  Such a claim naturally suggests the idea that technology is itself the product 
of a production process that it is responsive to investment in knowledge creating activity 
which, in turn, is constrained by an set of menus and recipes for generating technological 
knowledge9.  But this simply pushes the fundamental problems into the background, 
                                                 
8 The blueprint idea is used in Robinson (1956) and developed in Salter (1960). The idea of technology as  a 
recipe in practice is  widely used in the evolutionary school of economists. See Winter (1967), Nelson and 
Winter (1982) and Dosi and Marengo(1994) for an introduction to the general perspective. On the localised 
aspects of technical change see Antonelli, (2001) 
9 This, of course, simply pushes the argument one stage back since no explanation is provided for the 
technology to produce technology.  For one of the best accounts of induced innovation, one that recognises the 
importance of the relative ease of advancing knowledge in different directions see Binswanger (1974) 
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requiring an explanation of the technology to produce technology ad infinitum.  Moreover, 
technology is not like any other output that can be measured in its own units.  It is manifestly 
not a homogeneous stock in the sense that its magnitude can be reduced to a scalar measure, 
for there is no weighting system available by which we can reduce the knowing of different 
things to a common denominator (Metcalfe, 2002; Steedman, 2003).  At best what is known 
is a heterogeneous set of incommensurable elements.  The sense of heterogeneity is further 
deepened when we recognise that the recipes that underpin any input-output menu are also 
products of organisational and managerial knowledge, as well as technological and scientific 
knowledge in the narrow senses of human skill and of the laws of nature as applied to human 
artefacts.  But these different kinds of knowledge are generated by different processes in 
different contexts, in response to different incentive structures and take place at different rates 
over time, and this combined with the incompleteness of any recipe set points to the ill-
defined nature of production technologies.  How specific activities are articulated will depend 
on the minds making and actuating particular decisions as to which  recipe is to be used, and 
there is no warrant for the idea that firms, or rather the individuals within them, even in the 
same narrow line of business will possess the same technological, organisational and 
managerial knowledge required for the production of even identical goods and services.  This 
was well known to Marshall who put particular emphasis on the idiosyncratic nature of 
production knowledge in firms and it is central to the evolutionary theory of the firm and the 
competitive process10.   
 
It might be thought that the idea of knowledge as a public good with non rivalry in use and 
limited excludability leads directly to crisply defined production sets; that the presumption 
should be that all techniques are equally accessible to all firms, actual and potential.  That this 
is not so, offers a useful lesson in the nature of technology as knowledge.  The essential point 
is that knowledge only ever exists in the minds of individuals.  What is in the public domain 
is information, that is to say representations of individual knowings in the form of the spoken 
word, demonstrations of action and codified documents and media.  The possibility of 
economic and social order, of which a production activity is an example, depends on the 
relevant understandings being widely shared, as in the case of an understanding of the law 
and the rules of the game more generally.  But much knowledge is shared in a more restricted 
domain, which is a chief characteristic of the division of labour with regard to productive 
                                                 
10 Cf., Marshall (1920) , Nelson and Winter (1982).  Marshall needed his representative firm precisely because 
his industries are composed of differentiated firms articulating different recipes in different ways. 
 8
 #0909 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
knowledge.  Modern societies are collectively rich in their knowledge but the specialised 
individuals within them are privately ignorant about other than the very restricted domain of 
their skill and competence.  The ability to create information in a storable form and to 
communicate independently of face to face contact, is the basis of some of the most important 
technologies ever developed, in that long sequence from the invention of writing on durable 
materials, through printing and inks that last indefinitely, to the modern computer and 
information communication systems.  The distinction between knowledge, and human 
understanding and information, is crucial to our understanding of the uneven growth and 
uneven incidence of human knowing.  Knowledge is not in the ether ready, as it were to be 
“inhaled” at will without effort. On the contrary, while knowledge has the attribute of non 
rivalry in use, and while information may now be communicated at negligible marginal cost, 
this does not mean that the understanding of particular phenomena is available to anyone 
without effort and at negligible marginal cost.  Arrow (1974) captures this very well when he 
considers the codes that are needed to turn information into knowledge, such that 
understandings can be shared and joint action in organisations made possible.  But codes are 
an irreversible investment, they require time and effort to be accumulated, hence the 
importance of hierarchical education and training system that move the individual from 
general foundations into more specialised understanding of phenomena.  Indeed, it is a 
commonplace to associate the more advanced forms of technological understanding with 
highly specialised knowledge of narrowly defined phenomena.  The general purpose here is 
to impart understanding in common and to verify this through testing procedures but here 
there is a difficulty.  That a group of individuals may be party to the same information flow 
does not imply that they will experience the same changes in their personal knowledge11.  
Knowing is unevenly distributed and, more importantly, the growth of knowledge and 
economic progress depends on it being unevenly distributed.  We look to the idiosyncratic 
aspect of knowledge accumulation to identify the pioneering scientist or inventor and to 
identify the pioneering entrepreneur.  They have much in common, they have shared the same 
information flow with others yet they have each conjectured that their respective worlds can 
be different.  We do not look to the uniformity of human knowing to explain our increasing 
ability at problem solving but to its uneven and distributed nature.  It is precisely because 
                                                 
11 As any teacher knows only too well. 
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knowledge advances in this uneven way that we do not expect production possibilities to be 
sharply defined and understood in common, it is the necessary condition for progress12.   
 
These themes connect to the evolutionary development of knowledge as a variation cum 
selection process and to the parallel notion of evolutionary competition between 
differentiated firms who get things done differently13.  Here it is worth remarking that the 
profit motive provides a powerful stimulus to the differentiation of knowledge through the 
search for better goods and services and better means of producing them.  In general terms, a 
firm’s profits are not made by having the same technological expectations and articulated 
recipes as its rivals, which, of course, means that the implementation of entrepreneurial 
conjectures distributes unexpected losses as well as gains throughout the system; further 
encouraging the revision of entrepreneurial conjectures in a never ending pattern of stimulus 
and response.  There is a deeper issue here too.  As soon as we bring the generation of new 
knowledge within the economic system, it is no longer possible to treat  an economy as a 
system in equilibrium.  There are always incentives to generate and apply new techniques, to 
advance on the competition and change the prevailing market order, and so the economic 
system cannot be in equilibrium unless we can conceive of human knowing being in 
equilibrium.  Indeed, if an equilibrium of human knowing were conceivable, it would 
certainly usher in the stationary state indefinitely.  This restless dimension of knowing, is 
reinforced by the public good dimensions of knowledge, in so far as non rivalry equates to 
increasing returns to the use of knowledge already accumulated.  But it is not the use of 
knowledge in the production of goods and services that matters here but rather the use of 
knowledge in the cumulative production of further knowledge, the core of the “standing on 
the shoulder’s of giants” metaphor.  Thus production activities in firms, industries and 
economies are restless because under the rules of the capitalist game useful technological 
knowledge is restless: there are always good reasons to know differently. 
 
                                                 
12 Thus the function of Schumpeter’s entrepreneur is to act on the basis of conjectures that deviate from the 
status quo (Schumpeter, 1912).  The consequential division of individuals into those who lead and those who 
follow was part of Marshall’s treatment (1920) of innovation and business management too. See Metcalfe, 
(2007) for elaboration of this theme. 
13 There is an extensive parallel literature on the capabilities theory of the firm, one that emphasises the hard to 
imitate differences in managerial performance and competitive standing of rival firms in the same line of 
business.  See Winter (1967), Nelson (1991) , Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) and Dosi and Marengo (2000).  
Montgomery (1995) and Foss and Mahnke (2000) provide valuable overviews and connections between the 
ideas of capabilities, routines, transaction costs, imperfect contracts and so on..   
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With the idea of restless technology we have begun to stray into the idea of induced invention 
and innovation, or the idea of economic systems as a problem generating and problem 
solving structures.  From an economic viewpoint, the problems that command attention are 
shaped by the scale of the application of the solutions, and on the relative costs of different 
approaches to finding solutions14 This is a complicated area in which economic historians 
and historians of technology have made major contributions to understanding the distinctions 
between different kinds of knowing (science vs., engineering, for example), the causal 
interdependence between them as ways of solving problems, and the status of technology as 
applied science (Staudenmaier, 1989, Mokyr, 2002)15.  Nathan Rosenberg’s work on this is 
particularly instructive, for it points to the fact that one important source of invention stimuli 
may not relate to anticipated changes in factor prices but rather to the internal imbalances 
arising within technological systems arising from the uneven pattern of inventive discovery.  
He expresses the point thus, “technological problems arising in industry A are eventually 
solved by bringing to bear technological skills and resources from industries B, C, or D”.  
Like his imbalance principle in an individual activity, this give to the path of invention a very 
uneven course, a restless dynamic of development from within as solutions to problems 
uncover further quests for understanding.  This too is a consequence of specialisation and the 
systemic dimensions of production activities, such that advances in one element in the 
production process are constrained in their application by their interrelatedness with other 
elements, so inducing the search for improvements in the later16.  In this internal dynamic the 
solution of one problem simply serves as the creator of new problems, as if the search for 
improvement only serves to render unsatisfactory the prevailing aspects of the technological 
system17.  
 
Once we portray technology in terms of knowledge and activity embedded in the wider 
matrix of relationships in any economy then it becomes clear that we need a far finer 
                                                 
14 Schmookler (1966) argued persuasively that necessity is the mother of invention to which Rosenberg (1974) 
responded that not all problems are solved because of the cost of doing so.  This is where breakthroughs in the 
technology of technical change become important. Nelson (1983) has pointed out that changes in fundamental 
understanding often save exploration costs and redirect effort by showing were not to focus problem solving 
attention.  
15 Mokyr (2002) explores the theme of the origins of the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th centuries in 
terms of the interdependence of the growth of prescriptive knowledge and propositional knowledge 
Propositional knowledge is much more than formal science and includes a catalogue of known technologies. 
Developments in prescriptive knowledge depend greatly on developments in propositional knowledge, but this 
is not causation but complementarity. 
16 On interrelatedness see Frankel, (1955). 
17 Thomas Hughes (1983) develops the imbalance principle into the idea of reverse technological salients, which 
give rise to critical problems, unevenly capturing the attention of engineers and inventors.  .  
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understanding both of the benefits from specific advances and the costs of achieving them.  
We have reached the point where we need to pass beyond menus of inputs and outputs, and 
beyond blueprints and recipes to their generic purpose.   
 
3. Technology as Transformative Activity 
 
A useful entry point is the idea of a productive activity as humanly designed and orchestrated 
sets of operations that involve the transformation of materials and energy in one form into 
materials and energy in another form.  Since the purpose of the activity is to make the final 
form more useful than the initial form it is natural to think of this as performing work to add 
value.  In this perspective, technology recipes equate to transformation processes, in which 
the two defining characteristics are what is transformed into what, and by what means the 
transformations are carried out.  Every productive transformation process can be written in 
the general form 
 
      INPUTS  → TRANSFORMATION→      OUTPUTS 
                                                                                                          0TIME 1TIME
(Materials     ⊕     Energy)   →       (Materials ⊕ Energy) 
 
The symbol ⊕ indicates the action of ‘combining with’ not that of ‘adding up’.  The arrows 
indicate that every activity is a process with a time dimension, the length of an arrow 
indicating the time lapse between the moments of initiation ( ) and termination ( ) of a 
process (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971).  That production takes time is, of course, an essential 
feature of real production processes.  Each process of transformation is bounded, it has 
wholeness to it, a span of activity that must be completed before the process terminates.  
Time lapse and combination rate become the two operational dimensions of the process and 
the rate at which the process is activated can be measured either by a comparison of the 
differences in the state of materials at the beginning and end of the process, in broad terms, 
we compare what went in at  with what came out at . Alternatively, the rate of activation 
may be captured or metered, by a measure of the energy flow across the boundary of the 
process.   
0T 1T
0T 1T
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The first general point that follows from this perspective is that all production processes are 
joint production processes, irrespective of whether all of the outputs have an economic value.  
This is often most obvious in the case of chemical and physical production processes but the 
point is more general, for the list of outputs always includes elements of waste materials and 
waste energy18.  The second general point is that we are not referring to naturally occurring 
processes but to humanly instigated processes, that is to say, processes that are carried out for 
a purpose and with a requisite degree of understanding of the transformation principles that 
underpin the activity.  Production activities are matters of intelligent design and operation, 
and the guiding general purpose is to meet human needs in a superior way, or as it used to be 
put, overcoming the niggardliness of nature.  Thirdly, most manufactured products are 
produced by sequences of different elementary sub-processes generating the components that 
are ultimately combined into the final good.  As hinted at above, the point about the division 
of labour is that it is not simply a question of technological knowledge in the narrow sense, 
but of knowledge of how to organise and how to manage in terms of sequencing and 
controlling the systemic aspects of production within and between interlinked processes.  The 
organising and managing may occur in many different ways, and as Coase (1937) pointed 
out, the boundary that segments the division of labour between different producers is an 
essentially economic decision reflecting a choice between management through hierarchy and 
management through market processes19.   
 
We can group the generic classes of transformation process into three broad kinds, viz: 
 
• Physical: transformations, changing the physical form or chemical composition of 
materials and energy. 
• Spatial: transformations, changing the location at which materials and energy are 
available. 
• Temporal: transformations, changing the dates at which materials and energy are 
available. 
 
While the three classes of transformation are logically distinct, in a modern economy they are 
complementary and jointly underpin its input: output structure within and between production 
                                                 
18 On the thermodynamic principles behind transformation processes and the distinction between energy and 
exergy see Buenstorf (2004) 
19 For a valuable discussion of the relation between organisation and production see Langlois and Foss (1999) 
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establishments..  Some examples will help.  Under the first category we could consider the 
fashioning of the body of a motor vehicle from a sheet of steel, or the production of a 
synthetic drug from various chemicals, or the production of computer records of financial 
transactions.  In each case the application of energy induces a change in physical state of the 
material substrate of the process.  All activity that we classify in terms of manufacturing falls 
into this first category, it involves some changes in form of or composition of materials 
through processes of separation or synthesis, or assembly.  Agriculture falls within this 
category too.  Though, in agriculture, the processes are biological and chemical: the direct 
energy input comes primarily from the sun, and the material inputs are either carried over 
from the previous “seed” harvest or are added as human-made supplements to the fertility of 
the soil.  In the second category are found all the transport activities that move people, 
materials, goods, information and energy, to different places to satisfy the spatial dimension 
of distributed ways of living and producing.  We include here not only the transport of 
electric power and material goods but also the electronic transmission of information on the 
internet or by other media.  In the third category are found the general class of storage 
activities that preserve the continued existence of materials or energy over time.  A battery is 
a device for the inter-temporal transformation of energy, a refrigerator a device for the inter-
temporal transformation of perishable food, and a book or a computer memory are devices 
for the inter-temporal transformation of information20.  
 
Much is made of the fact that modern economies are service economies with some 70% or 
more of GDP accounted for by a heterogeneous collection of what previous writers called 
tertiary activities to distinguish them from agriculture, extraction and manufacturing (Clark, 
1944).  Where do services fit in this scheme?  The answer is very precisely within the three 
categories of transformation.  What we refer to as transport, whether of goods or people, is a 
typical example of a service activity, as are many storage activities such as those carried out 
by retailers when making goods available for view by customers.  In the case of personal 
services, the transformations are carried out on the individuals acquiring the service; the 
person is the material basis for production.  Thus the quintessential hairdresser carries out a 
physical transformation of the client, while the surgeon does the same when a medical 
intervention is performed, as does the transport operator when performing a spatial 
transformation of the passengers..  Many of these service activities are in reality maintenance 
                                                 
20 There are many different possible taxonomies of production activity, dividing and further subdividing our 
three broad categories.  See Buernstorf (2004) for an excellent discussion. 
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procedures on humans and might, from this perspective, be classed along side the repair and 
maintenance of countless physical devices.  Information services and related activities also fit 
naturally within the general transformation scheme, in that they involve the manufacture, 
capture, transport and storage of information in different kinds of media.  Although, 
computers have replaced the ledger and manuscript as stores and manipulators of 
information, the underlying principle is the same, though the clerical function is no longer 
performed with pen and paper, nor is the output of this recording process communicated by a 
postal service.  In the case of financial services, a modern bank is, among other aspects, a 
recording system for capturing and transforming, communicating and storing records of the 
levels and changes in the wealth of its clients.  In fact the manufacture, transport and storage 
of information has always been essential to a monetary market economy but it has taken the 
IT revolution and the electronic manipulation of materials to make this basic feature manifest.  
 
This said, what is the connection with economic perspectives on technology outlined in the 
previous section, for the two are very different?  Production is carried out for intelligent 
purposes; it is purposeful in the technological sense of particular combinations of causes 
leading to particular effects, and also in the economic sense of generating a value to the 
outputs that is intentionally greater than the value of the material inputs.  Although value-
added is a correlate with the intelligent work that is carried out in the production process, it is 
not grounded solely in the physical, organisational and managerial  aspects of production but 
in the wider determination of revenues and costs that are associated with consumption and the 
supply of factor services  Doing work implies also implies something that is worked on, and 
something that does the work and this is the basis for the distinction between produced means 
of production and factor inputs.  It is the later that do the work, and value-added equates to 
the incomes that are generated.  Since transformation involves action on materials through the 
intelligent deployment of energy it follows that the factor services contributed by the primary 
inputs must be closely connected with the purposeful, controlled application of energy to 
those materials.  Here the further distinction is made between the primary productive factors 
and the flows of productive services that are drawn from them.  The factors or funds, as 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) calls them, perform the work in the sense that they are the vectors 
to apply and control the flow of energy.  To focus on the later, the economist often suppresses 
the role of the myriad forms of materials that contribute to the scheme of production.  As 
Carter puts it “the coal and ore and steel and chemicals, and fibres and aluminium foil; 
sausage casings, wire products, wood pulp, electronic components, trucking and business 
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services, remain enclosed in the economic black box that converts primary inputs into final 
output” (p. 4).  One can certainly do this, resolving the production of materials and inanimate 
energy at successive stages of production into the work done by the factor inputs alone, until 
the initial extractive stages are reached.  In this way one distinguishes the direct from the 
indirect quantities of the primary inputs involved but at a cost.  First one loses sight of the 
systemic interdependence of the production process, an elaborate division of labour not only 
within particular processes but between them.  Secondly, as we shall comment on below, the 
economic analysis of technical change is severely distorted if it is reduced to the saving of 
factor inputs alone, whether directly or indirectly.  
 
Among the primary factors primacy of attention must be devoted to human effort and the 
many forms of productive service that it produces, each kind premised on a particular 
specialised body of understanding.  The knowledge of a transformation process and the 
purposes for which it is directed exist only in human minds; activities have to be invented, 
designed and constructed as well as operated.  The traditional role of labour as a primary 
factor is to supply energy to operate tools in an intelligent, fashion, or to control the 
application of inanimate energy via the use of machinery and other capital structures.  Since 
different stages of production are usually involved, organisational, supervisory and directing 
inputs are also required to gather and communicate the information necessary to keep the 
bundle of processes operating in a balanced way within the unit of production.  These non 
physical inputs also involve the expenditure of energy and absorb material inputs, and the 
knowledge of how to organise, supervise and direct is on a level of importance with the 
knowledge of the physical processes involved.  An element of joint production is involved 
here too, in that the output of the process are the mentally and physically tired workers, 
whose lost energy must be replaced in other, “household”, production processes if the activity 
is to continue.  What is far less readily recognised is that more knowledgeable workers may 
also be an output of the production process: Adam Smith certainly understood this but the 
point is more general, in that a production plant is a site of learning as well as transformation 
in the narrow sense, an idea that has become commonplace in the notions of learning by 
doing and learning using21.   
 
                                                 
21 See Rosenberg,(1982), chapter6. 
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The case of “land” as a primary agent, the original but not indestructible powers of the soil, is 
rather straightforward, it performs its services by serving as a spatial net to capture solar 
energy and by its contribution to the growth of plant material through the release of mineral 
sources of chemical energy.  When we turn to the idea of capital as a factor of production the 
issues are rather more complicated. 
  
In so far as we focus on capital goods and structures, these are produced, durable and semi 
durable outputs of the production system.  To this degree they are like land (and the sea), and 
like land and labour they are partially worn out during any production process and need to be 
maintained or replaced.  Capital goods and other capital structures are equivalent to other 
produced material and energy  inputs, except for their longevity, but this difference in the 
rates of durability captures only part of the nature of capital goods and structures.  Their more 
fundamental dimension is that they are designed and constructed to facilitate the application 
of useful energy to the materials in the production process, including in this the production of 
energy in different forms.  We speak of tools that are activated by human energy and of 
machines that are activated by inanimate energy.  The sustained growth of machine-based 
production methods is the correlate of the growing application of inanimate energy through 
ever more sophisticated means to produce different forms of energy, to transform one energy 
form into a more useful one, and to control the work that is done in countless different ways.   
As Paulinyi (1986) has pointed out, the crucial historical step that makes this abridgement of 
labour possible is the mechanisation of the relation between tool and material.  In turn, this 
required the surmounting of a wide range of technical problems in relation to the control and 
measurement of motion, before human or animal energy could be replaced by inanimate 
energy.  Thus, it is not surprising that capital goods are the focus of so much inventive 
activity in order to solve interrelated problems of energy and material transformation, or that 
their use has provided such a stimulus to the advance of the natural sciences (Rosenberg, 
1963).  The thrust of the history of technology is that capital goods and capital structures of 
an ever-expanding range have been the principal vectors through which the knowledge-
growth connection is made.  Knowledge of new transformation processes, almost invariably, 
has been embodied in sets of new capital instruments.  Not only do we find in the record an 
infinite variety of new machines to capitalise on new materials and to produce entirely new 
kinds of commodity but we also find new machines to make the machines.   
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The idea that capitalism is a system characterised by the production and use of capital goods, 
or produced means of production more generally, would seem to be so obvious that it is 
scarcely worthy of further comment.  Yet, historically, the concept of capital goods (and 
especially its close relations, ‘capital value’ and the ‘time phasing’ of production activities) 
have been associated with a long series of controversies that embody and reveal deep fault 
lines between different formulations of the economic process (Kurz and Salvadori, 1995).  
When economists assert that “capital” is a primary factor they are not only referring to these 
machine complexes or to goods tied up in general but rather to a quite different point that 
production takes time22.  This lapse of time locks up resources that could otherwise be used 
in consumption, as with the classical idea that the wages of the workers form a capital value 
fund, just as do the materials on which they work.  This idea is extended by later writers 
(Jevons, for example, 1879) to include the capital goods in which the fund is temporally 
embodied.  Whether capital value is a productive agent on a par with human agency and land, 
is a deeply contested point23.  The sense in which it can be thought of as a given quantity to 
constrain production activity is not at all clear, once we depart from Marshall’s short period.  
Outside of this context, the long period quantities of the various capital goods and structures 
and the prices at which they are produced and valued are the outcome of investment decisions 
and thus endogenous to the system.   
 
Among the different approaches to capital as productive agent, the Austrian school has made 
important contributions.  Ludwig Lachmann, for example, in his book, Capital and its 
Structure (1956), begins from the classical position that capital has no single unambiguous 
meaning and what it is crucial to comprehend is the heterogeneity of forms of capital goods 
and the multiple specific uses to which many capital goods can be put.  Moreover, capital 
goods are rarely used in isolation and it is the complementary combination of different capital 
goods within specific production plans that gives capital its structure.  The theory of capital is 
about patterns of combination and use, the morphology of forms (p. 4) in which the 
                                                 
22 As Jevons (1879) expressed it, “It is a matter of time elapsing between the beginning and the end of industry” 
(p. 248).  J.B. Clark (1899) developed the Jevonian perspective into the doctrine that the capital of a society is a 
single organic whole, not any particular instrument of production.  It is permanent fund measured in value units, 
though at any moment it is largely (not entirely) embodied in things of a sort which more or less regularly wear 
out, are used up or become obsolete, and are replaced by other items of the same or different prescription (p. 
460) That it may be viewed as a value fund is one thing, its permanence is quite another.  The idea that time 
elapsing has a cost which constrains investment activity, is reflected in Marshall’s concept of waiting, and in 
Fisher’s notion of time preference or impatience. 
23 For contrasting views, the standard references are Harcourt (1972), Bliss (1975) and Kurz and Salvadori 
(1995) 
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composition of a functionally differentiated stock is as significant as its magnitude.  From an 
economic viewpoint capital goods find their meaning in production plans and it is in the 
context of such plans that they acquire a forward looking value.  These values are always 
transient, since, in a progressive economy, the capital structure is always being reformed, 
particularly in response to changes in knowledge.  Maladjustments occur and capital value is 
often lost in the process and the role of the entrepreneur is to reallocate existing capital goods 
to new production plans and attempt to turn loss into profit.  The idea of capital structure as 
an emergent feature of the market economy, parallel to productive knowledge as an emergent 
feature, is an appealing way to interpret Lachmann’s argument in modern terms. .There is no 
need at any point for such a system to be in equilibrium, the prevailing set of capital goods 
may always be misallocated relative to perceived opportunities to utilize their services.  The 
same physical set of capital goods may have over their economic lifetime a plethora of 
occupations and values none of which need bear any relation to the cost of their production.  
There is nothing mystical, or particularly significant about capital value, it is what the market 
says it is.24  
 
4. The Pattern of Advancing Technical Knowledge 
 
The real benefit of focusing on the material and energy based nature of transformation 
schemes is that they bring into relief the three great strands of technological advance in the 
history of technical invention since the earliest times25.  These are the discovery of new 
sources of inanimate energy and the means to harness energy to different production tasks, 
the discovery of new materials contained in the earth’s crust, atmosphere and oceans, and the 
                                                 
24 One of the few economists to consider the idea of a structure of capital instruments in any formal way is 
Salter (1960) in his account of the mechanisms through which productivity growth is influenced by the spread of 
new techniques embodied in particular plants.  Salter took the relation between what is meant by technology and 
the production function a good deal further.  The link between knowledge and the production function is 
complex and reflects knowledge of differing degrees of generality and proximity to the process of production, 
from basic principles of fundamental phenomena to the further knowledge required to apply them to production 
and knowledge required for day to day operation.  Thus some knowledge is relevant to the design of production 
facilities and some to their operation, including the operation of the plants that build the facilities in question.  
Frankel (1955) also examined the interrelatedness of capital and the technical interdependence of the 
components of an assemblage of capital goods within a plant, focusing on the adoption of innovations and the 
potential disadvantages of already acquired sunk investments.  Apart from the work of Salter and Frankel there 
appears to be relatively little formal economic treatment of the structure of capital good complexes in an 
economy and next to no discussion of the implications of assemblages of capital goods for the progress of 
invention and innovation, the themes that Smith and Babbage had identified in the early stages of the industrial 
revolution. 
25 The parallel invention of organisational and managerial technologies (social technologies as Nelson (2005) 
expresses them) is a quite different but far more difficult to document story, partly because these dimensions of 
knowing have no built structure as counterpart.   
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discovery of synthesised materials that have no natural existence but are combinations of the 
materials in the earth’s endowment.  Within each strand there are multiple sequences of 
technological development and any one sequence may apply differentially to the three kinds 
of transformation with important interdependencies.  The outcome is the greater productivity 
of activities in the economist’s sense but this masks the fact that productivity growth is not 
only a matter of efficiency enhancement in producing a given list of goods but the result of 
greatly extending that list.  Product innovation matters at least as much as process innovation 
and the major histories of technology reflect these distinctions in great detail, tracing the 
development of technologies to harness the inanimate energy of wind and water, namely, the 
sailing ship, the windmill and the water wheel is followed by the development of steam 
power and electricity and so on to the computer and its complementary consequences26. The 
search for ways to harness these new energy sources provided a continual stimulus for the 
invention of machines and the corresponding development of branches of engineering and 
supporting fundamental sciences that result in the abridgement of human effort, whether 
physical or mental.  The development of the natural sciences certainly plays an important part 
in this story of co evolution of activity and knowledge, but the stimuli undoubtedly run both 
ways as the development of working, practical knowledge stepped ahead of formal 
understanding and stimulated a search for general principles27.(Mokyr, 2002).  As a 
consequence, economic development and growth is never, a case of steady, balanced 
proportional expansion but rather it is a matter of uneven development, as entire new 
branches of production are created, develop and diffuse, reach maturity and then slip into 
decline.  This qualitative as well as quantitative unevenness in the development of the 
productive fabric is matched closely by the uneven development of useful knowledge28.   
 
Of all the economists who have written on the interplay between new energy sources, new 
materials and new capital structures, Marx’s account is pre-eminent29.  As is well 
documented, he describes the evolution of capitalism across different regimes for organising 
processes of transformation, from manufacture to modern industry.  Manufacture required the 
bringing together within one location various independent crafts, while subdividing these 
                                                 
26 A by no means exhaustive includes Gille, 1986; Singer, Holmyard and Hall, 1958; Klemm, 1959; Usher, 
1929, 1954; Landes, 1969, Mokyr, 2002, Hughes, 2004, 
27 For a fascinating account of mechanical invention and the development of power technology in medieval 
times see White, (1962). 
28 This is a central theme in modern evolutionary growth theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Nelson, 2005) and in 
the earlier writing of Simon Kuznets (1954, 1971, 1977) 
29 See in particular, Rosenberg (1982), chapter 2. 
 20
 #0909 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
tasks into a fractional division of labour in which the proportions of each step are set by their 
respective rates of throughput.  Modern industry, by contrast, is marked by the invention and 
use of machinery.  The tools and instruments are connected to a power source, which is 
increasingly based on inanimate energy, culminating in what Mumford (1934) was to term 
carboniferous capitalism.  From this follows a detailed ‘division of machinery’ with groups of 
capital goods forming production complexes subject to the fractional principle of multiples.  
In parallel there is a second major step in this development process.  This is the emergence of 
the industries to produce the machine and capital structure, with more and more branches and 
a more refined division of specialisation, so forming the technical foundation of modern 
industry in the capacity to produce machines capable of many varied tasks with materials as 
refractory as iron.  In turn, this requires and stimulates the creation of the system of river 
steamers, railways, ocean steamers and telegraphs, which in turn required the “cyclopean 
machines to fashion them from iron” (p. 363).  Thus the machine was taken in hand, and 
machines constructed by machines.  What mattered in Marx’s account was the extension of 
the machine-manufacture methods to the making of machines, so eliminating a fundamental 
constraint on the rate at which they could be created and thus a major constraint on the 
expansion of a system premised on the production and application of inanimate energy.  As 
produced means of production, their supply not only became infinitely elastic, the conditions 
of supply became the focus of multiple inventive efforts and the focus of a technological 
revolution (Paulinyi, 1986).   
 
Among other leading students of technological change, Usher captures extremely well this 
interplay between the discovery of new energy sources, new materials and the creation of 
new kinds of transformation process.  One reason why Usher’s history of these events is so 
compelling is because of his attempt to develop a non-equilibrium theory of invention, to 
pose and answer the question, ‘How do new things happen?’(p. 60).  The approach is notable 
for two reasons: it is combinatorial, and it is systemic, the development of technology is the 
interplay between parts and wholes and some parts contribute to many wholes.  For Usher, 
invention is a contingent social process applied to devices that are complex systems, and 
inventive success by any individual is not preordained but depends upon the context, which 
includes the stages already reached by other individuals.  Strategic inventions are defined by 
the combination of multiple acts of novelty, the higher degrees of synthesis required to 
achieve their successful combination, and the important role of acts of insight that identify 
problems and inconsistencies in design, and thus stimulate critical revision.  Moreover it is 
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through the combinatorial nature of the process that it remains open ended; Usher’s temporal 
sequences do not have an end in any present moment (p.46). . 
 
5. Summary 
 
We have covered a great deal of ground, although much has been left unsaid, the price one 
normally pays for trying to provide a short discussion of technology in economic analysis.  
One might sum up as follows.  Technology as the way of getting things done is more than a 
matter of lists of inputs and outputs; it is more than a matter of blueprints and recipes for it 
depends greatly on the human dimensions of skill and knowing.  It is inseparable form the 
idea of a division of labour and a correlated division of knowing, ultimately concerned with 
the productive transformation of material and energy to meet human needs.  Thus it is 
capable of many forms of expression and it is the uneven nature of knowing that gives to an 
economy its evolutionary foundations and its dynamic properties.  This is the heritage of 
Smith, Marx, Schumpeter and Marshall; it is capable of a great deal more development.   
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